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ABSTRACT
Once the breadbasket of Southern Africa, Zimbabwe has undergone a radical
transformation presently characterized by ever increasing rates of HIV and AIDS, low
population growth, acute food shortages, radically decreasing life expectancy,
hyperinflation, and insecurity of life and property. Additionally, the growing brutality of
political and electoral oppression has engendered significant domestic, regional, and
international condemnation of the Zimbabwean government. News media, human rights
organizations, and foreign governments have all voiced their concern for the rapid
deterioration of Zimbabwe.
This thesis analyzes the course of Zimbabwe’s economic, political, and social
decline between its independence in 1980 and 2005. While popular interpretations place
blame predominantly upon President Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African UnionPatriotic Front, this thesis offers a more nuanced explanation for Zimbabwe’s current
crisis. This view contends that the structural adjustment policies of the Bretton Woods
institutions, in concert with the breakdown of democratic institutions and the
implementation of radical land reform policies led to Zimbabwe’s current economic,
political, and social decline.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL
ANALYSIS
Zimbabwe achieved independence from white minority rule in 1980 after a hardfought liberation struggle. However, the challenges for the newly independent state were
many. The Zimbabwean economy was still dominated by the minority white commercial
farmers who numbered about four thousand, but controlled one-third of the land. The
black population, on the other hand, was relegated to areas that had poor soil, inadequate
rainfall and weak infrastructure. Consequently, the options for the black population were
limited to working on white farms for low wages. The Mugabe government, which came
to power in 1980 with a radical socialist agenda, was faced with a dilemma. The
economy was driven largely by the export-oriented large tobacco and maize farms of
white-owned commercial farms. Additionally, white farmers also produced a broad
range of crops for the domestic market. This settler-dominated economic system had to
be balanced against a broad range of conflicting interests in Zimbabwe’s black
population, the most important one being land redistribution.
Throughout the first decade of independence, Robert Mugabe adopted a gradual
approach to this controversial issue. This policy was shaped by two important factors.
First, Zimbabwe’s economy at independence was relatively prosperous and there was the
real danger that radical reforms could jeopardize economic stability. Second, prior to
1990, the government was constrained by the stipulations of the Lancaster Accords which
1

prohibited seizing white farms without compensation. In spite of these constraints, the
government made great strides in improving the living conditions of the majority black
population and also providing skilled Africans opportunities in the white-dominated
private sector.
In the past fifteen years, however, Zimbabwe’s economy has experienced a
significant downward spiral. This has led to two important developments. First, the
Zimbabwe African Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has abandoned its gradual policy
of land redistribution in favor of a radical, Fast-Track approach. Second, there has been a
dramatic shift from Mugabe’s socialist ideology to a policy of economic liberalization.
In addition to economic destabilization, corrupt policies favoring colonial institutions and
severe governmental mismanagement have eroded Zimbabwe’s democratic institutions.
One-partyism, electoral fraud, intimidation tactics, and complete disregard for judicial
authority and human rights have left Mugabe and ZANU-PF isolated from international
support and facing intense opposition from civil society organizations.
A majority of the interpretations of Zimbabwe’s economic, political, and social
decline place the blame primarily on either the Zimbabwean government or the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund’s Economic Structural Adjustment Policy
(ESAP). This thesis goes beyond the conventional scholarship of the past three decades to
offer a more nuanced analysis of Zimbabwe’s current economic, political, and social
crisis and argues that the Fast-Track land reforms instituted in February 2000 are the
culmination of structural and institutional deficiencies that have existed in Zimbabwe
2

since before independence. These reforms, which have been hurriedly orchestrated, are
the results of the failure of ZANU-PF to properly resolve the weaknesses of the
Zimbabwean economy at independence. They are also attempts at creating political
legitimacy in the face of rising social disillusionment, spirited political opposition by
Morgan Tsvangirai and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and economic
paralysis engendered by the liberalization policies of the World Bank and IMF.

Historiographical Analysis

Post-independence Zimbabwean studies have undergone multiple transformations
in the three decades following the transfer to majority rule. Since 1980, the literature has
been divided into three primary phases: the transition to majority rule and the
consolidation of power, democratization, and the rise of authoritarianism. Each phase is
indicative of scholarly opinion of Zimbabwe and its leadership; specifically regarding the
hope and promise of a racially harmonious and democratically constructed state.
Studies conducted during the transition period (1980-1988) were conceived in a
sweeping wave of euphoria and international goodwill. As a result, scholars were often
moderate in their criticisms; maintaining a reserved optimism and focusing primarily on
the integration of old guard Zimbabwean Nationalists into the new majority government,
Mugabe’s Socialist rhetoric and its potential conflicts with private capital, and the shift
3

from radical guerilla warfare to democratic governance. Additionally, limited knowledge
resulted in only superficial scrutiny of ZANU-PF’s shortcomings, notably economic
development and human rights policies, during what Martin Meredith calls the
Zimbabwean “Honeymoon” period of 1980-1981. 1 In the words of historian Terence
Ranger, “Any attempt to assess at this moment the prospects for radical change in
Zimbabwe confronts a crippling imbalance of knowledge.” 2
Throughout the 1980s, the continued repression of civil liberties and violent
government reactions to opposition supporters were becoming commonplace. Still, these
events were either completely ignored by Western scholars, or rationalized as after
effects of Zimbabwe’s repressive colonial legacy and the need for strong government
intervention to assure regional stability. 3 Recent literature interprets the absence of
watchdogs within the academic community as a form of self-censorship. Many believed
that drawing attention to human rights violations would only exacerbate already virulent
tensions in the region, and limited scrutiny constituted an assurance of continued stability
in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa. 4
However, by the early 1990s, the optimism of the first decade of independence
had dissipated at the hands of mounting economic concerns and growing

1

Meredith, Mugabe: Power and Plunder, 41-57.
Terence Ranger, “The Changing of the Old Guard: Robert Mugabe and the revival of ZANU,” Journal of
Southern African Studies 7, no. 1 (October 1980), 71.
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Ronald Weitzer, “In Search of Regime Security: Zimbabwe Since Independence,” The Journal of Modern
African Studies 22, no. 4 (1984): 529-557.
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Liisa Laakso, “Research Debates in Zimbabwe: From Analysis to Practice,” in Twenty Years of
Independence in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism, eds. Staffan Darnolf and Liisa Laakso
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 4.
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authoritarianism. Consequently, scholarly interpretations of Zimbabwe assumed a much
more historical approach based on empirical data. Revisionist literature began to
challenge the existing nationalist narrative of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. Also, the
incorporation of gender studies allowed for the inclusion of previously unheard voices of
the liberation struggle. More than anything, this period saw a transformation in the
academic community’s perception of Zimbabwe from a possible beacon of democracy
and racial tolerance in Southern Africa to an increasingly pragmatic and interest-based
state, particularly with regards to economic liberalization and privatization.5
With a decade of governance to analyze, researchers began to probe deeper into
Zimbabwe’s political process, stressing the need for multi-party politics and criticizing
the one-party state that had existed since the merger of ZANU-PF and ZAPU-PF in 1987.
Transition-era literature had created a façade of pragmatism, reconciliation, and relative
governmental strength steeped in socialist ideals. Initially, Zimbabwe was seen as a
hybrid state, a combination of neopatrimonialism and competitive multi-party politics. 6
However, beginning in the late 1980s scholars began to question both Zimbabwe’s
governmental stability and its legitimacy as a Socialist state.
Criticism stemmed from two primary factors. First, the growth of multi-party
states throughout Eastern Europe and the rest of Africa raised significant questions about
the democratic legitimacy of Zimbabwe’s one-party system. Second, the liberalization of

5

Ibid., 5.
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Comparative Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 79, 82.
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the economy along the model pushed by the World Bank and IMF signaled an end of the
Socialist revolution at the heart of Zimbabwe’s independence movement. Institution of
the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in 1991 significantly damaged the
reputation and authority of Mugabe and ZANU-PF due to their inability to rely on the
rhetoric of the previous decade. 7
Structural adjustment caused many to question the advantages of economic
liberalization on Zimbabwe’s economic standing. According to Jørn Rattsø and Ragnar
Torvik, the advantages of trade liberalization affected only the export of raw materials
(minerals, agricultural produce, and horticulture) instead of manufactured goods. This
dependency model stressed what most researchers have held true for the past decade of
Zimbabwean studies; that the ESAP instituted in cooperation with the World Bank and
IMF has significantly disrupted and retarded the growth and diversification of
Zimbabwe’s economy by placing greater emphasis on the privatization of industry and
incorporation into the world market. According to Alfred Nhema:

“[S]cholars recognized that the revolutionary zeal that had characterized ZANUPF’s liberation struggle had dissipated after independence. A common theme pervading
these analyses is the notion, steeped in dependency theory, which views the ruling elites
as too weak and reliant on foreign capital. As such they were merely a neo-colonial
governing African petit-bourgeoisie pliantly serving the goals of their colonial masters.” 8

7
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In addition to its economic stability, the democratic institutions in Zimbabwe
were also called into question. Scholars like Masipula Sithole analyzed the shift from a
nation and government born in guerilla warfare to a centralized state fearful of opposition
and political instability. 9 Since the mid 1980s, various Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) had been reporting of human rights violations perpetrated under governmental
authority. Notably, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and the Legal
Resources Foundation’s (LRF) report on atrocities in the Matabeleland and Midlands
provinces between 1980 and 1988 was instrumental in increased international pressure on
the Zimbabwean government for the preservation of multi-party democracy and human
rights. 10
By the mid-to-late 1990s, response to the CCJP/LRF report, declining economic
stability, and new international pressure spearheaded by Great Britain, Zimbabwean civil
society, and international lenders resulted in widespread criticism of ZANU-PF and
Robert Mugabe. As a result, Zimbabwean studies underwent yet another thematic
transformation focused on the state’s growing authoritarianism and socio-economic crisis
that has since divided the academic community. Beginning in the mid-1990s, a number
of books, including Martin Meredith’s Mugabe: Power, Plunder, and the Struggle for
Zimbabwe and Stephen Chan’s Robert Mugabe: A Life of Power and Violence, have
established corrupt governance by Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF as the primary causes
9

Masipula Sithole, Democracy and the One-Party State Debate in Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe (Harare:
Sapes Books, 1992).
10
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the Silence,
Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-1988
(Harare: Legal Resources Foundation Legal Publications Unit, 1999).
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in Zimbabwe’s economic and social collapse. However, there are those who question
such a simplistic analysis, and instead interpret Mugabe’s policies within a broader
international context. John L. Moore posits that the Western interpretation of the crisis is
misguided and myopic, and that the effects of the World Bank and IMF structural
adjustment policies are primarily responsible for the deterioration of Zimbabwe’s
economy and social stability. 11
Structural adjustment as an institution has come under fire in recent debates about
the validity of economic liberalization in developing nations. Those like Sarah Bracking
claim that while unnecessary:

“[S]tructural adjustment did work: it closes a brief historical chapter when
political independence partially disrupted the dependent economic linkage
between the countries of Africa and the core creditor states of global capitalism.
It did work because it represents a conjuncture where holders of international
money and those of domestic political power were reunited and consolidated in
the governance structures of the indebted states.” 12
However, scholars like Moore, L. M. Sachikonye 13 and William Brown 14 severely
question the effectiveness of structural adjustment and criticize oversight on the part of
Bretton Woods institutions, the EU, and other Western lenders in the disbursement of
needed economic stimulus in the early 1990s.

11

Moore, Zimbabwe’s Fight to the Finish.
Sarah Bracking, “Structural Adjustment: Why It Wasn’t Necessary & Why It Did Work,” Review of
African Political Economy 26, no. 80 (June 1999), 208.
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L. M. Sachikonye, “Zimbabwe: Drought, Food, and Adjustment,” Review of African Political
Economy , no. 53 (March 1992), 92.
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Beyond structural adjustment, recent scholarship has branched off to study the
various actors in Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis, their contemporary relevance, and how the
past three decades have altered their roles within society and government. Alfred
Nhema’s book titled Democracy in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Liberalization
emphasizes the impact of civil society groups (business interests, labor, women’s
movements, professional associations, social and religious organizations, and the media)
on the power and authority of the Zimbabwean government. Nhema maintains that the
decision by the post-independence Zimbabwean government to maintain aspects of the
exclusionary UDI framework to forward their explicit goal of a one-party state caused
clashes with civil society organizations who were attempting to cement their own
authority as watchdogs.
Perhaps the most important of these civil society groups are the war veterans of
the Second Chimurenga. The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
(ZNLWVA) became an instrumental force in pressuring Mugabe and ZANU-PF in
allocating compensation for veterans and their families. As a result of their 1997
demonstrations, the Mugabe regime was thoroughly shaken and forced to pay a
significant lump sum (Z$ 50,000), monthly pensions (Z$ 2,000), free education, and
reevaluate its land redistribution policies. 15 After the failed constitutional referendum
three years later, war veterans’ direct involvement in precipitating and enacting the land
seizures of 2000 caused scholars to begin dissecting the material and ideological

15

Nhema, Democracy in Zimbabwe, 144.
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motivations of this group as well as their relationship with the Zimbabwean government.
Norma Krieger’s chapter titled “Zimbabwe’s War Veterans and the Ruling Party:
Continuities in Political Dynamics” analyzes this relationship in detail. Specifically, she
notes the failures of ZANU-PF in providing adequate compensation for liberation fighters
and the ability of these individuals to challenge state power through a united front. 16
Jocelyn Alexander reiterates this claim. She emphasizes the economic hardships
throughout the early-to-mid 1990s as a primary reason for the rise in veteran movements
against the government. 17
Building on her studies of the war veteran movement, Alexander has also
contributed one of the seminal works on Zimbabwe’s relationship to its land and the
government’s use of the issue for appeasement and mass mobilization. The Unsettled
Land: State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893-2003 explores the multifaceted impetus of the war veteran-spurred land seizures through a mix of historical
analysis and contemporary case studies. Alexander effectively shows how shifting policy
dynamics in the wake of structural adjustment have caused land to be the primary
political currency in the failing Mugabe regime.
While most scholars argue that literature concerning Zimbabwe is divided into
three distinct periods: the transition to majority rule and the consolidation of power,

16

Norma Krieger, “Zimbabwe’s War Veterans and the Ruling Party: Continuities in Political Dynamics,”
in Twenty Years of Independence in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism eds. Staffan Darnold
and Liisa Laakso (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003),
17
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Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis, eds. Amanda Hammar, Brian
Raftopoulos, and Stig Jensen (Harare: Weaver Press, 2003),
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democratization, and the rise of authoritarianism, I maintain that recent events demand a
fourth installment into the nation’s historiography. Following the failed constitutional
referendum of 2000 and the subsequent land seizures by “war veterans,” new dynamics
emerged which have further exacerbated the already virulent tensions brewing from the
previous decade. The current “crisis literature” that had emerged is reflective of
increased scholarly interest and criticism. In Jocelyn Alexander’s words:

“It suddenly seem[s] possible to write about politics in Zimbabwe, and specifically about
land, without reference to the high modernism or customary projects of previous decades.
Analysis [has] shifted to a focus on the partisan violence of veterans, youth militias and
security forces, to ZANU-PF’s manipulations of nationalist history, and the struggles of
civic organizations, trade unions and the political opposition...Zimbabwe seemed to be
entering the world described by political scientists of Africa elsewhere – the ‘politics of
disorder’, the ‘politics of the belly’.” 18

My own thesis falls squarely within the realm of crisis literature. I contend that
fundamental structural problems within the state that have existed since before
independence have resulted in the limited economic sovereignty and collapse of
Zimbabwe. This poor governance, rooted in the shortsighted economic policies and
ideological goals of a one-party state, created an environment which exacerbated the
structural adjustment policies pushed by the Bretton Woods institutions. Additionally,
the rise of civil society in the form of trade unions, human rights organizations, and
multi-national advocacy groups placed further stress on an already limited toleration of
opposition by the Zimbabwean government.
18

Jocelyn Alexander, The Unsettled Land: State-Making & the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893-2003
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11

The following chapters analyze the course of post-independence Zimbabwe from
its roots in Marxist-Leninist ideology through its decline as result of economic
liberalization, governmental mismanagement, rampant corruption, and the failure of
democratic institutions. Chapter two analyzes the historical background of Zimbabwe’s
current crisis. Beginning with the unchecked wave of European colonialism in the late
nineteenth century, it discusses the British push into Southern Africa, the subsequent
subjugation of native populations, and the issue of land in the colonial context.
Additionally, it chronicles the rise of nationalism in Southern Rhodesia and the racial
impetus for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. Finally, chapter two
analyzes the rise of Robert Mugabe to national and international prominence during
Zimbabwe’s liberation war and transition to majority rule.
Chapter three analyzes the first decade of independence, spanning from the
Lancaster House Agreements to the beginnings of land redistribution and the onset of
economic liberalization. Specifically, it focuses on ZANU-PF’s attempts to cultivate a
Socialist state through one-partyism and Mugabe’s penchant for violent repression of
opposition forces. Finally, chapter three will highlight the evolving role of civil society
organizations and their often contentious relationship with the Mugabe government.
Chapter four analyzes the domestic and international factors that contributed to
the economic, political, and social decline of Zimbabwe in the second decade of
independence. Beginning with structural adjustment and economic liberalization by the
World Bank and IMF, this chapter discusses the tumultuous relationship between Robert
12

Mugabe and the West. In addition, chapter four analyzes the economic and political
destabilization of Zimbabwe through military intervention in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, rising tensions between the government and civil society organizations,
dissension by war veteran groups, and the rise of the Movement for Democratic Change.
Finally, the aforementioned factors are shown to cause the breakdown of democratic
institutions and necessitate the implementation of Fast-Track land resettlement for the
sake of political expediency.
Chapter five analyzes the aftermath of Fast-Track land reform and the continued
deterioration of Zimbabwe’s political, economic, and social stability. Specifically, it
details the devastation wrought by Mugabe’s attempts to quell opposition support through
violence, intimidation, and electoral fraud in the 2002 presidential elections and 2005
House of Assembly elections. In addition, this chapter discusses Operation
Murambatsvina, during which Mugabe ordered the clearing of city centers under the
pretense of urban renewal, leaving hundreds of thousands homeless and drawing the
condemnation of the international community. Finally, chapter five places Zimbabwe’s
current crisis in the larger historical context and draws correlations between recent events
and themes prevalent throughout Africa’s colonial and post-colonial history.

13

CHAPTER TWO: ZIMBABWE BEFORE INDEPENDENCE

In order to properly understand the historical context land reform, it is necessary
to first explore the colonial period in Southern Africa. By understanding Zimbabwe’s
early colonial legacy, and later the nationalist struggle for independence which
culminated in the Second Chimurenga, the importance of land in Zimbabwean society
will have greater clarity in the post-colonial context. Additionally, causes of Zimbabwe’s
political, economic, and social paralysis will begin to take on a broader focus to include
international economic interests.

European Colonization, 1885-1900

By the 1880s, European incursions into Africa began to escalate into a scramble
for territory aimed at expanding traditional spheres of influence. At the urging of
Portugal, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck called an international conference in
Berlin to which he invited representatives from the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain,
Portugal, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France, Denmark, Russia, Italy, SwedenNorway, the Ottoman Empire, and the United States. From November 1884 to February
1885, the Berlin Conference established rules for the colonization of Africa by European
14

powers. Consequently, Africa was partitioned into regions, or spheres, dominated by
Germany, France, Great Britain, and Portugal. France gained control of the majority of
West Africa, Belgium maintained their control of Central Africa, the British East and
South Africa, Portugal gained small areas in West and South Africa, and Germany
controlled areas in all four geographical regions.
British incursions into Southern Africa began almost a decade before with their
annexation of the South African Republic (ZAR) in 1877. After the First Boer War
(1880-1881) returned independence to the Boers, Britain declared its own protectorate in
the region by intervening in Bechuanaland (Botswana) in 1885. Discovery of gold in the
ZAR a year later prompted Britain to charter Cecil B. Rhodes’s British South African
Company (BSAC) in 1899 after the diamond magnate was able to secure mineral rights
from King Lobegula of the Ndebele. Hoping that gold found north of the Transvaal
could counter ZAR domination in the region, Rhodes led his settler columns into the
region between the Limpopo River and Lake Tanganyika in 1890. 19 While gold
prospects proved to be disappointing, settlers were able to occupy nearly one-sixth of the
chartered territory during the 1890s, primarily on the rich central highveld, constituting
nearly the entire Ndebele kingdom. 20
The area known initially as South Zambezi -- and after 1901 Southern Rhodesia -was the center of much conflict in the mid 1890s. Between 1893 and 1894, the First
Matabele War pitted King Lobegula and the Ndebele against BSAC settler forces. While
19
20

John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 191.
Ibid., 205.
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severely outnumbered, the superior firepower of the British proved overwhelming for the
Ndebele. After the suspicious death of Lobegula in 1894, the Ndebele submitted to
BSAC authority and Matabeleland was brought under settler control.
However, the BSAC’s newfound authority was short-lived. In response to the
aggressive white seizure of land, drought, cattle plague, and locust invasion, the Ndebele
of Matabeleland, followed by the Shona of Mashonaland, rebelled in 1896 in a series of
continuous, well organized, and intensely violent acts of dissent against colonial forces.
What would later become known as the Second Matabele War, or First Chimurenga 21,
would constitute the official end of native control in the region and leave a bitter memory
of defeat and subjugation in the hearts and minds of the native population.

Colonial Land Policies, 1890-1969

Zimbabwean political discourse has been dominated by the issue of land since the
first pioneer columns of the BSAC arrived in Mashonaland in 1890. Initial speculation
consisted of two hundred free farms amounting to fifteen hundred morgen (3,175 acres)
each. However, the continued arrival of speculators, military personnel, missionaries,
and pseudo-aristocrats in following years caused land holdings by the meager white

21
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population to expand to include some sixteen million acres, or nearly one-sixth of all
available land, by the turn of the century.
Exacerbating the already virulent tension over white consumption of land was the
institution of a reserve system in the first decade of the twentieth century which placed
nearly two-thirds of the Shona population within reserves totaling 37 percent of available
land in Mashonaland. Similar systems were put into place for the Ndebele in which onethird of the population lived on just 16 percent of previously held lands. At roughly
750,000, the black population was initially capable of surviving within the constraints of
the reserve system. However, with the rapid population growth of the following decades,
overcrowding became a severe problem. Additionally, despite the possibility that blacks
would be able to purchase lands outside of the reservations, few could realistically afford
relocation.
With the formalized division between black and white land holdings in Zimbabwe
through the 1931 Land Appointment Act, explicitly exclusive and racially biased division
lines were drawn in Southern Rhodesia. White held lands continued to consume black
territory not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. White settlers -- as of 1931
numbering less than fifty thousand, with only eleven thousand settled on farms -- now
possessed nearly half of available land and unquestionably the richest and most fertile
soil. The one million strong black population was relegated to roughly twenty million
acres of sub-standard, often barren territory.

17

Rapid agricultural expansion following the end of the Second World War and
subsequent immigration from Europe between 1945 and 1960 created the continual need
for increasing amounts of land for white settlers. As a result, greater numbers of blacks
were forced onto reservations that were already severely overcrowded by a population of
between two and three million. Mounting hardships both inside and outside the reserves
led to rapidly increasing levels of discontent among the black population. Consequently,
the post-war years saw the emergence of a swelling tide of nationalism and a call for
majority rule. The resulting backlash would result in thirty years of continuously
repressive legislation by the Southern Rhodesian government and increasingly violent
responses from the black majority.

The Rising Tide of Nationalism

Early attempts at social reform in Southern Rhodesia were a direct response to the
overwhelming poverty of their constituents. The foundation of multiracial societies, such
as the African Capricorn Society, in the early 1950s were not calls for open rebellion, but
instead championed the end to exclusionary policies instituted by the Southern Rhodesian
government. However, with the settler regime’s continued unwillingness to grant
Africans equal rights under the law, the scope and focus of social movements in the mid1950s became far more politicized. By the end of the decade, Africans in Southern
18

Rhodesia were represented by three political organizations: the City Youth League
(CYL), the African Voice Association, and the African National Congress (ANC). To
further their goals of raising African political consciousness, regardless of education or
background, the three parties combined to create a unified national party. The Southern
Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) was launched on September 12, 1957
with ANC President Joshua Nkomo retaining his position and former CYL party chair
James Chickerema as Vice-President. 22
As the new party increased its influence and spurred rural resistance, the Southern
Rhodesian government -- despite resignations of influential members such as Federal
Chief Justice Sir Robert Tredgold -- responded by passing even more restrictive
legislation including the Unlawful Organizations Act, the Law and Order (Maintenance)
Act, the Native Affairs Amendment Act, the Preventative Detention Act, and the
Emergency Powers Act. Finally, in February 1959, over five hundred members of the
SRANC were arrested and detained and the party declared unlawful. 23
Despite the banning of the SRANC, nationalists were not deterred in their efforts
and formed the National Democratic Party (NDP) on January 1, 1960. Soon afterwards,
with Nkomo reclaiming his position as President, the NDC petitioned the British
government to hold a constitutional conference that allowed equal representation for all
parties. In 1961, Britain acquiesced and an agreement was reached in which Africans
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were allotted fifteen out of a possible sixty-five seats in the legislature. Widespread
discontent swept through nationalist camps, particularly regarding the weakness of
Nkomo in handling the situation. As a result, several leading members of the NDP
publically criticized Nkomo and refused to recognize the new constitution. Violent
tactics were employed to prevent Africans from participating in the following year’s
elections, and by the time relative peace was restored in December 1961 the NDP was
banned and its leadership – with the exception of Nkomo – was arrested. 24
Eight days after the banning of the NDP, Nkomo formed the Zimbabwe African
Peoples’ Union (ZAPU). While a direct heritor of the nationalist cause, ZAPU
broadened its objectives to include:
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• the institution of a policy of one man, one vote as the basis of government;
• to maintain the spirit of democracy and love of liberty among the people of
Zimbabwe;
• to fight for the total liquidation of imperialism and colonialism, direct and indirect
and to cooperate with any international forces supporting this struggle;
• to create conditions for the economic prosperity of the people under a government
based on the principle of one man, one vote;
• to foster the spirit of Pan-Africanism and work cooperatively with other
movements in Africa and elsewhere supporting the spirit of Pan-Africanism;
• to promote the development of the best values in African culture and traditions
with a view to establishing a desirable order 25

ZAPU represented Nkomo’s attempt to bring Zimbabwean independence, and the end of
colonialism in Southern Africa, to the international stage. While Nkomo was able to
garner support in the United Nations Assembly and achieve a resolution calling for a new
constitution, the Rhodesian government responded with increasingly restrictive
legislation designed to further hamper nationalist insurrection. ZAPU was banned on
September 20, 1962, and responding to pressures by Julius Nyerere and other African
leaders, Nkomo returned to Southern Rhodesia to join his fellow nationalists in
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confinement. By 1963 ZAPU had yet to set into place a clear and decisive course for
Zimbabwe’s independence beyond petitioning the United Nations and Great Britain.
Compounding problems, a new settler regime lead by the right-wing Rhodesian
Front gained power in 1962 with promises to quell African nationalism and maintain
white rule. The death penalty was introduced and the powers of the Law and Order
(Maintenance) Act were increased.

In response to this new threat, divisions arose

within ZAPU and resulted in the formation of two rival nationalist organizations, the
People’s Caretaker Council (PCC) -- a front for Nkomo’s ZAPU -- and the Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU), lead by the Methodist clergyman Reverend Ndabaningi
Sithole in August 1963. Discord between the two groups soon resulted in violent
conflicts characterized by pitched battles, gang warfare, petrol bombings, arson, stoning,
and assaults. 26
As the infighting between the PCC and ZANU spread into the white community,
the Rhodesian Front government feared that Great Britain would give into nationalist
pressures for majority rule. Rhodesian Front leaders saw such an action as an irreversible
end to their privileged status and the prosperity of Southern Rhodesia. In response to
Prime Minister Winston Fields’ unwillingness to enact plans for white independence, he
was replaced by his deputy Ian Smith. Smith played on the fears of the white community
and effectively quelled any voice of dissent by banning all African political parties,
detaining over two thousand Africans without trial, and banning all national newspapers
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such as The African Daily News, Zimbabwe Sun, and Chapupu, which championed
African viewpoints. Finally, when all negotiations with Great Britain failed to resolve
the issue of majority rule, Smith announced the unlawful Unilateral Declaration of
Independence (UDI) on November 11, 1965.
The UDI was initially met with acts of domestic terrorism such as sabotage and
crop destruction, and organized protests in urban areas. In total, eighty incidents of
sabotage occurred between November 1965 and July 1966. Smith’s racist and
exceedingly restrictive policies under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act would foster
more militant attitudes from the PCC and ZANU. The abolition of African political
parties, the institution of the Land Tenure Act 27, and new Rhodesian Constitution in
1969 28 further cemented Smith’s desire to “[sound] the death knell of the notion of
majority rule.”
The final straw in the increasingly tense state of Rhodesian race relations came in
response to the November 1971 Anglo-Rhodesian constitutional proposals granting
Africans limited franchise and allowing for a gradual increase of Africans in the
legislature. The increase would follow a formula which would maintain a white majority
in the legislature and a de facto one-party state until 2035, resulting in a backlash of what
Bishop Abel Muzorewa called “the repressed fear, restless silence, forced tolerance and
hidden hatred” within the African population. As a result of continued repression by
27
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Smith and the Rhodesian Front, and contemptible attempts in granting African franchise,
escalated guerilla war broke out in December 1972, beginning almost seven years of
continued warfare and the end of minority rule in Rhodesia.
Attitudes of suppression and the resulting powerlessness of the black population
would result in a crusade to recover lost lands. The Second Chimurenga of the 1970s
would be the violent articulation of these attitudes. More importantly, Robert Mugabe,
by 1975 one of the two prominent voices of the war for majority rule 29, first used the
promise of land to lend mass support to his movement. This would not be the last
instance of Mugabe using land reform as a tool of mass mobilization.

The Rise of Robert Mugabe and the Second Chimurenga

Robert Mugabe’s story is a common one in African nationalism. Born Robert
Gabriel Mugabe on February 21, 1924 to a carpenter father and catechism-teaching
mother, he was an exceptional student and model example of the Catholic mission
system. After receiving his teaching diploma in 1945, Mugabe held multiple positions
throughout Southern Rhodesia, and in 1949 won a scholarship to Fort Hare University
College in South Africa. It was at Fort Hare that Mugabe was first exposed to Marxist
thought and the nationalist movement. By the time of his return to Southern Rhodesia in
29
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1952 -- and throughout his time in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) in the following
years -- Mugabe had become disenchanted with the system and yet remained distant to
the calls for independence and resistance.
Not until his move to Ghana in 1958 did Mugabe become enamored with the
prospect of an independent and unified Africa. As the continent’s first independent
nation in 1957, Ghana represented the hope and possibility that was unimaginable in
neighboring colonies. However, it was on a visit to Southern Rhodesia in May 1960 to
introduce his fiancée to his parents when Mugabe became a fully awakened nationalist by
protesting the arrest of friends belonging to the NDP and taking part in what has become
known as the March of the Seven Thousand. This transformative experience prompted
Muagbe to resign his post in Ghana and become a full-time activist.
For the greater part of the 1960s, Mugabe, along with the majority of highranking Zimbabwean nationalists, was held in indefinite detention. Between his arrest in
1963, and his release in 1974, Mugabe underwent intense personal and ideological
evolutions brought on by the death of his son and his continued academic studies. 30
Emerging from his eleven years of imprisonment, Mugabe was dedicated to the cause of
revolutionary struggle and the freedom of Zimbabwe from the tyranny of minority rule. 31
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His soft-spoken nature, brilliant intellect, and single-minded ambition served as a both a
source of admiration and caution amongst his fellow nationalists.
Upon his release, Mugabe was determined to reconstitute the liberation struggle
under the ZANU banner. However, several prominent African statesmen -- notably
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia -- saw Mugabe’s ambitions
as counterproductive to their goal of a unified front between ZAPU and ZANU. When,
in November 1974, ZANU elected Mugabe to replace Ndabaningi Sithole as President,
Kaunda threatened sanctions against the Zimbabwe African Liberation Army (ZANLA),
based in Zambia. Additionally, conflict between the Shona-based ZANLA and the
Ndebele-dominated Zimbabwe People’s Liberation Army (ZIPRA) 32 resulted in open
conflict between the rival organizations. However, by 1977, primarily due to his efforts
in organizing guerillas in Mozambique, the assassination of popular ZANLA commander
Herbert Chipeto, and his ability to discredit Sithole, Mugabe was able to gain the support
of guerilla leaders and bring ZANU fully under his control, forcing his immediate
recognition as the primary leader of armed resistance in Rhodesia.
By 1976, the pressures of constant warfare had exacerbated the decade-old
embargos of the UDI and forced the Rhodesian government to adjust their stance on
majority rule. As of 1978, the war accounted for 40 percent of government spending, and
15 percent of the GDP. 33 Additionally, in 1979 Smith announced that the cost of the war
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had quadrupled over its five years. 34 In the 1979-1980 budget, defense and security
accounted for 37 percent of projected expenditures and the national deficit had grown to
$Rh 460,000,000. 35
After being rejected in their earlier advances by nationalist still residing in
Salisbury, the Smith regime finally submitted to a settlement that would grant majority
rule while protecting white interests, much to the distaste of ZANU and ZAPU.
However, when it became clear in mid-1979 that the British government would not
recognize the new Zimbabwe Rhodesia government under Bishop Abel Muzorewa all
nationalist organizations joined in new negotiations at Lancaster House in London. 36
After three months of intense debate and bargaining, an agreement was reached that
established a new constitution and procedures for a transfer of power. In mid-December
British authority was temporarily reinstated and a cease-fire effected, and United Nations
sanctions lifted.
From February 27-29, 1980, closely supervised elections were held that included
nine political parties. The Zimbabwe African Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) won an
overwhelming majority, fifty-seven seats and 63 percent of the vote. Mugabe was asked
to form the new government as Prime Minister while Canaan Banana, a Methodist
minister and long-time advocate for racial justice, was named President. 37
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Table 2.1. Results of Common Roll Elections, 1980
Party

Total Valid Votes
Percent of Valid
Seats
Cast
Votes
NDU
15,056
0.568
0
NFZ
18,794
0.709
0
PF
638,879
24.113
20
UANC
219,307
8.277
3
UNFP
5,796
0.219
0
UPAM
1,181
0.045
0
ZANU
53,343
2.013
0
ZANU (PF)
1,668,992
62.992
57
ZDP
28,181
1.064
0
Source: House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
Africa, 96th Cong., 2d sess.

Few thought the election of Mugabe, a noted Marxist and radical guerilla organizer, as
Prime Minister to be plausible. However, according to Richard M. Moose, former
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mugabe’s candidacy was strengthened
when viewed in the African context as well as from several factors including:
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•

his image as a nationalist who organized the principal and most successful
fighting force;

•

his identification with the majority Shona tribal group;

•

his ability to project himself as a winner;

•

Muzorewa’s relatively lackluster performance during his period in office and his
close identification with the whites and with South Africa. 38

For Nkomo, who believed himself to be the “Father of Zimbabwe,” the loss to ZANU-PF
was a bitter pill to swallow. His victory in the Matabeleland Province had granted his
Patriotic Front twenty seats, but relegated Nkomo to nothing more than a regional leader
of the Ndebele and Kalanga people. Initially offered the ceremonial post of President,
Nkomo declined and instead accepted the position of Minister of Home Affairs, which
controlled the police. However, the distrust and political humiliation suffered at the
hands of Mugabe would foreshadow the continued feud between the two prominent
figures of Zimbabwean independence.
Zimbabwe’s independence marked the end of seventy years of economic,
political, and social oppression at the hands of settler society. Under the socialist vision
of Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe attempted to rectify the injustices of the colonial period
while simultaneously seeking reconciliation with long-time enemies. However, the
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divided nature of Zimbabwean society -- punctuated by decades of land stratification and
subjugation by the minority white population -- remained despite the transfer to majority
rule. Additionally, competition between Mugabe and Nkomo fostered deep distrust
among their respective political parties, placing strain on democratic principles. As
Zimbabwe entered its first decade of independence, it faced significant questions about
the integration of colonial institutions into the new majority government, the
redistribution of land to the dispossessed masses, the impact of international donor aide
on Zimbabwe’s economic performance, and potential conflict between Mugabe’s
socialist vision and Western democratic principles. The following chapter will analyze
these issues as well as how Mugabe and Zimbabwe’s fledgling government strove to
define themselves as an independent people free from the chains of colonialism.

30

CHAPTER THREE: ZIMBABWE’S FIRST DECADE OF
INDEPENDENCE

This chapter analyzes the first decade of Zimbabwe’s independence under
majority rule and the political developments that contributed to economic, social, and
political crises in the following decades. It traces the evolution of ZANU-PF from an
organization born in the midst of radical guerilla warfare and intense political oppression
to one attempting political consolidation and ideological revolution. Specifically, this
chapter illustrates three key factors that shaped the first decade of Zimbabwean
development. First, the virulent issue of land reform and the unwillingness of the new
majority government to abolish policies that strengthened colonial institutions and forged
unhealthy relationships between private enterprise and government interests. Second, the
changing global market and international lenders’ impact on Zimbabwe’s economy, and
third, the rise of a de facto one-party state following the Matabeleland Massacres and
rising unrest among civil society groups.
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Post-Independence Land Reform, 1980-1989

Zimbabwe’s independence and the introduction of a multi-racial democratic
society marked the end of seventy years of oppressive political, economic, and social
controls. Despite its newfound sovereignty, one of the major obstacles facing the
fledgling government was the unequal allocation of quality land and the inability of
small-scale commercial farmers to procure arable tracts. Under the Land Tenure Act of
1969, land was quantitatively equal, but was qualitatively poor for black Zimbabweans.
Table 3.1. Principle Land Categories under the Land Tenure Act of 1969
Land Category

Area (Hectacres)

Percent of Total

15,337,096
2,768,020
18,145,116

39.4
7.1
46.5

16,291,670
1,415,921
494,617
18,202,084

41.7
3.6
1.6
46.6

European Land
General Farming Land
Other Land – Parks, Forests, etc.
Total
African Land
Tribal Trust Land (Communal)
APL (SSCF)
Other Land – Parks, Forests, etc.
Total

National Land
2,727,617
6.9
Total Zimbabwean Land
39,074,817
100.0
Source: Sam Moyo, “The Land Question,” Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of
Transition, 1980-1986, ed. Ibbo Mandaza (Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 1986), 168.

The impetus of resettlement was derived from a historical precedent of landlessness at the
hands of white settlers, and represented a vehicle of mass mobilization utilized
32

extensively during the liberation war. After independence, the landless majority sought
reparations for the seven decades of injustice imposed upon them by settlers. However,
under the terms of the Lancaster House Agreements foreign aid was dependent upon the
reallocation of land on a willing buyer-willing seller basis. This practice would result in
divisions between the socialist goals of Mugabe and the complexities of Zimbabwe’s
inherited economic system, entrench of the white minority for years to come, and create a
festering desire for radical resettlement in the following decades.
While the majority of the African population believed that the new majority
government would bring about radical social, political, and economic changes, Mugabe
declared shortly after ZANU-PF’s victory that:

“We will ensure that there is a place for everyone in this country. We want to ensure a
sense of security for both the winners and the losers. There will be no sweeping
nationalization; the pensions and jobs of civil servants are guaranteed; farmers will keep
their land. Let us forgive and forget. Let us join hands in a new amity.” 39

Therefore, rather than dismantling the old guard, Mugabe instead curbed the socialist
ambitions of his constituency and maintained the long-held status quo, continuing the
statist economy that had strictly regulated foreign exchange, imports, and prices for the
past fifteen years. According to Alfred Nhema:
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“While Mugabe extolled the virtues of socialism to his own African supporters, no
exhortations of that nature were preached to white capitalists. To their pleasant surprise
the whites discovered that hegemonic control they had attained through military and
political means could still be retained via the forces of economics.” 40

With the overwhelming majority of Zimbabwe’s GDP coming from white owned
industry, mining, and business, it was imperative for the economic stability of Zimbabwe
that the white community be allowed to maintain their holdings after independence. In
the prophetic words of Ian Smith, “They [whites] have the skills and the capital. I’m not
a racist, but it’s the story of Africa: Every black country that forces its whites to leave has
become a tragedy.” 41 The aforementioned provisions in the Lancaster House Agreements
made foreign aid contingent on the protection of property, specifically land, thus making
ZANU-PF’s goal of radical redistribution unfeasible. While some see Lancaster House
as a continuation of unequal land policies and a direct bridge from imperialism to neocolonialism, the fact remains that after witnessing the chaotic destabilization that
occurred after the white exodus from Mozambique, Mugabe and ZANU-PF recognized
the pragmatism behind maintaining large-scale agricultural production and a white
cornerstone of the economy. In 1981, agricultural exports accounted for 46 percent of
Zimbabwe’s total domestic export value. 42 Therefore, with the appointment of Dennis
Norman of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) as Agriculture Minister, the
cooperation between settler strongholds and the new Zimbabwean government began.
40
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Despite the early limitations placed on ZANU-PF, the government began
implementing limited land reform through the policy of “moderation and reconciliation”
in 1981. A White Paper on economic policy entitled “Growth with Equity,” published in
February 1981, stated that one of the government’s main objectives was “to end
imperialist exploitation and achieve a greater and more equitable degree of ownership of
natural resources, including land, and to promote participation in, and ownership of, a
significant portion of the economy by nationals and the state.” 43 However, the plan also
stressed the importance of the white community in maintaining Zimbabwe’s economy,
thus making white farmers “something of a protected species.” 44
Under “moderation and reconciliation” the majority of Rhodesia’s state
bureaucracy and officials retained their positions. While Mugabe’s Africanization policy
assured that the majority of Zimbabwe’s civil servants were black 45, whites still
comprised the upper echelons of power. In a blatant contradiction of their liberation war
promises of land redistribution on the people’s terms, ZANU-PF offered land not as the
historical right of the dispossessed, but instead under the banner of production and state
regulation. 46 Throughout the early 1980s, resettlement goals grew at substantial rates.
1980 target goals were eighteen thousand families, based primarily on need and
effectively managing the communal reserves. By 1981, the number was tripled to fifty-
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four thousand families, and in 1982 tripled again to 162,000 families. 47 While the 19811982 and 1982-1983 financial years accounted for seventy percent of land purchases
through 1989, by 1985, only thirty-five thousand families had been resettled on the lessdesired tracts of former “European” land.
Therefore, the fundamental question surrounding land redistribution in the first
decade of independence was the comprehensive value of settled lands. Quantity, natural
quality, and access to water for irrigation were all of significant consequence for those
seeking tracts for private and small-scale commercial use. More so, at the outset of
independence, the distribution of arable land still reflected the qualitative inequality of
land settlement. 48
Table 3.2. Distribution of Irrigation-Based Farming by Agricultural Subsector,
1981
Agricultural Subsector

Area in
Hectares

Large Company Estates
30,400
Commercial Settler Farms
10,500
Commercial Farm Units
80,000
ARDA (Tilcor) Estates and Settlers
5,900
Small-Scale Irrigation in Communal Areas
2,800
Small Community Irrigation Schemes
400
Total
Source: Whitsun Foundation, 1981

130,000

47

Percentage

23.4
8.1
61.5
4.5
2.2
0.3
100.0

Ibid., 113.
Sam Moyo, “The Land Question,” in Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986, ed.
Ibbo Mandaza (Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 1986), 180.
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However, a lack of international funding for the purchase of new lands, coupled
with a new emphasis on production, caused a significant shift in land reform during the
mid-1980s. The rising black middle class feared that the reallocation of land to a
relatively unskilled black peasantry would inevitably harm Zimbabwe’s economic
prosperity. With the publication of the Communal Lands Development Plan in 1985 and
the First Five-Year Plan in 1986, agrarian reform expanded its definition to include
“translocation settlement” (what had traditionally been known as merely “resettlement”)
and “internal resettlement” (a reorganization of the reserves where the majority of the
population lived). Under internal resettlement twenty thousand families were to be
moved annually into planned villages located in each district while arable land was
divided into blocks with rotational grazing and irrigation programs. As a result, the
redistribution of land became of secondary importance, and a technocratic policy
centered on maintaining pre-independence production levels superseded the traditional
communal social hierarchies. The choice of villigisation over resettlement proceeded
slowly and caused misgivings from both those scheduled for resettlement as well as from
the district councils. Additionally, the lack of cooperation, coordination, and education
on the part of the councils caused many of the pilot villages to remain unoccupied as late
as 1988. 49
By the end of the 1980s, land reform came to represent the contradictory policies
of first decade of independence. While public policy advocated social welfarism and the
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resettlement of underutilized land on a willing buyer-willing seller basis, the lack of
international financial support, resistance by the CFU, and the emergence of a
technocratic policy of villigisation and internal resettlement overtook the socialist ideals
of the liberation war. In the words of Hevina Dashwood:

“While some saw justice [redistribution of wealth] as based on the concept of
scientific socialism, others saw justice as the right to take part in and profit from
the existing capitalist structure, a right which had been largely denied them under
the previous racist regimes.” 50

Additionally, the aforementioned rise of the new black middle class drastically
altered the political and economic composition of Zimbabwe in the first decade of
independence. With the emergence of black entrepreneurs as owners of large scale
commercial farms and the embourgeoisement of the new ruling elite, significant divisions
arose within the state that pressed for a market-based economy and minimal land
redistribution instead of socialism. However, decreased production as a result of drought,
changes in international politics following the end of the Cold War, increased corruption
within the Zimbabwean government, and clashes with civil society resulted in drastic
changes in Zimbabwe’s economic and political collateral. These issues will be addressed
with greater detail in the next chapter. First, it is necessary to examine Zimbabwe’s
economy in the first decade of independence and the impacts it had on the political
stability of the country.
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Economic Realities of Independence and the Rise of International Financial Institutions

Zimbabwe’s post-independence economy has been the subject of much scholarly
debate since the institution of structural adjustment and economic liberalization in 1991.
Scholars have focused on the government’s preservation of power superseding the
implementation of its war-time promises of wealth redistribution. While early policy
emphasized rural development, increased access to public services, employment
opportunities, and reconciliation with the white community, Mugabe quickly recognized
the necessity of co-opting white business interests over socialist reform. Despite early
dissention and mistrust by both sides, by the time of Mugabe’s reelection in 1985 and the
consolidation of ZANU-PF power following the 1987 Unity Accords, white business
interests also realized the necessity of cooperation and national unity for economic
stability.
Throughout the early 1980s, Zimbabwe’s statist economy maintained
strong oversight on foreign exchange, imports, and prices. Industry was protected from
foreign competition, and state-owned businesses monopolized the domestic market. A
large portion of commodities (beef, dairy, grain, etc.) were heavily regulated, and ZANUPF took control over industry and financial institutions. 51 Maintaining Ian Smith’s
isolationist mindset, Zimbabwe’s ideological stance existed in opposition to conservative
governments in the United States and Western Europe who were in favor of
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privatization. 52

The country’s First Five-Year National Development Plan laid out the

groundwork through which Zimbabwe would attempt to achieve sustained economic
expansion through state investment and cooperation with private enterprise. According
to the plan, growth would be achieved through:
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(I)

establishment by the state of new enterprises in strategic industries;

(II)

state participation in existing strategic enterprises with the role of the state
gradually increasing until majority or full ownership by the state;

(III)

joint ventures between the state and private capital on terms which allow
for eventual ownership by the state;

(IV)

establishment of co-operative ventures in industry, commerce, trade and
agriculture as well as participation of local authorities in the economy;

(V)

workers’ education in management, technical skills and ideology in order
to increase the efficiency of workers and their ability to participate in the
running of enterprises as well as increase their ideological consciousness;
and

(VI)

encouragement and acceptance of private local investment and foreign
investment on terms conducive to, or consistent with socialist
transformation 53

Between 1980 and 1982 Zimbabwe’s economy saw booms resulting from renewed
international investment, the lifting of UDI sanctions, and favorable harvests. However,
by 1982 the growth of the previous two years was overtaken by sharp global economic
decline and regional drought. While the IMF and World Bank were able to curtail the
slump in 1983, Zimbabwe’s economy never returned to its previous levels. Heavy
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emphasis on social welfare programs only exacerbated spending and forced the
government to radically shift its development goals. Unlike many African countries,
Zimbabwe was able to effectively manage this debt; however, it was ultimately forced to
curb heavy spending on healthcare, education, and land reform in order to maintain
production levels for debt repayment.
Table 3.3. Zimbabwe’s Foreign Trade 1979-1985 ($ Million)
1979 1980
Export FOB 1080 1446
Import FOB 875
1339
Source: Republic of Zimbabwe

1981
1451
1534

1982
1312
1472

1983
1154
1070

1984
1174
989

1985
1243
1003

Zimbabwe’s continued economic deterioration was a result of failure by ZANUPF to reform the statist economic structures inherited from the UDI and international
factors including drastically rising interest rates, oil costs, and a drop in the price of
commodities. 54 While the drop in commodity prices in the 1980s was offset by increased
volume, it was unavoidable for Zimbabwe and many Sub-Saharan African countries to
borrow heavily from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to counter trade deficits
and balance of payments. Even though Zimbabwe had strong international support in the
early 1980s, donor aide and income levels were not substantial enough to curtail rising
foreign debt. Additionally, increased cooperation between IFIs and major donor
countries such as the United States and Great Britain only cemented the relationship
between the Bretton Woods institutions and international aid to Africa. By the beginning
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of the 1990s, this relationship would be central in the push for structural adjustment and
Zimbabwe’s eminent crisis.
However, by the end of the decade, the ineptitude of Zimbabwe’s state-business
nexus became obvious. Excess and graft overran the bureaucracy, causing it to swell to
monumental proportions. As a result, budget deficits and public debt skyrocketed, the
country became increasingly dependent on external markets, and foreign investment
rapidly decreased. As a result of fiscal ineptitude and the necessity of economic
liberalization, civil society groups that had once been the source of strength for Mugabe
and ZANU-PF began to exercise their roles as watchdogs with ever-increasing prejudice.

The One-Party State and Civil Society Watchdogs

While the 1980s are generally considered a period of relative stability and
progress in Zimbabwe, the fear of counter-revolution supported by ZAPU was a constant
source of concern for ZANU-PF. Between 1980 and 1988, the Matabeleland Provinces
of western and southern Zimbabwe were inundated with dissident attacks and
government reprisals. Even though scholars have dismissed the popular belief that these
insurrections were the result of ethnic rivalries between ZANU and ZAPU; facts
substantiate that ethic affiliations played a major role in dissident activities. While the
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majority of those considered dissidents came from ex-ZIPRA units, Mugabe and ZANUPF relied heavily on a Shona-centric Task Force to assure regional stability.
The most blatant example of ethnic favoritism was the formation of the North
Korean trained Five Brigade in October 1981. Their existence outside of the normal
army command structure, Shona background, and direct control by the Prime Minister’s
office assured a rapid and direct response to any perceived threat. Despite limited acts of
insurrection in the first two years of independence, when arms caches were discovered on
land owned by ZAPU in 1982, Mugabe immediately expelled Nkomo and three of his
senior advisors from the cabinet. Less than a year later, in January 1983, Five Brigade
was dispatched to Matabeleland North, murdering over two thousand civilians, beating
countless more, and burning hundreds of homesteads. By January 1984, Five Brigade
had moved into Matabeleland South and implemented strict curfews and transportation
restrictions. 55 Official reasoning for such heavy-handed tactics was that without Five
Brigade, dissidents would have overwhelmed the provinces, allowing South Africa to
gain a foothold in the region.
In retrospect, the motivations of Operation Gukurahundi 56 were purely political.
Removal of Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU opposition, whose support was based in the Ndebele
population of the Matabelelands, was of paramount importance to Mugabe heading into
the 1985 general elections. When votes were tallied, Mugabe was once again victorious,
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gaining 76 percent of the vote (a 12 percent increase). While ZAPU was able to gain
fifteen seats in the legislature (a five seat loss), the party was no longer able to function as
a stable political entity due to its imprisoned and displaced leadership and absence from
Muagbe’s cabinet.
Beginning in late 1985, ZANU-PF began negotiating the integration of ZAPU
into ZANU-PF with little success. In response to Nkomo’s refusal of integration and
demands for a coalition government, and claiming that ZAPU actively supported
dissident movements, Cain Nkala, Minister of Public Affairs, banned ZAPU public
meetings, closed its offices nationwide, and dissolved six ZAPU-dominated local
governments. 57 As a result of their newfound political impotency and increased
harassment at the hands of ZANU-PF, Nkomo reluctantly agreed to resume talks. On
December 22, 1987 the Unity Accord Agreement was signed, officially integrating
ZAPU in ZANU-PF, cementing Mugabe as head of both parties, and beginning a de facto
one-party state in Zimbabwe. 58
Ultimately, the Unity Accords were a political contradiction. While the power of
the executive had been significantly increased, the senate was abolished and thirty nonconstituency seats were added in Parliament, including twelve presidential appointees. 59
In response to stagnant economic policies and the unchecked power of the one-party
state, civil society organizations grew in militancy and took on an ever-increasing role as
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government watchdogs. Through media outlets, trade and labor unions, NGOs, churches,
and student movements, ZANU-PF found themselves under an increasing cloud of
scrutiny. This trend would reach its zenith in the mid-to-late 1990s.
The primary concern for civil society groups was the need for democratization
and pluralism following the Unity Accords. Mugabe’s unabashed call for a one-party
state and ZANU-PF’s increasing involvement in corruption scandals led student
organizations to publically protest the state of affairs. Government overreaction in the
form of riot police, arrests, and closing of the University of Zimbabwe harkened back to
the oppressive tactics employed under the Smith regime. Consequently, union leaders
such as Morgan Tsvangirai, secretary-general of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU), publically supported student protests. He was afterwards detained for
six weeks without trial. 60
However, no amount of political pressure or fear tactics could prevent the graft
and cronyism of ZANU-PF from eventually coming out. Scandals such as Willowgate,
in which businessmen, politicians, and civil servants attempted to sell automobiles on the
black market at inflated prices, revealed how the new elite were attempting to use their
positions of power and influence for personal financial gains, a direct affront to the
Marxist-Leninist principles they publically subscribed to. Additionally, discrepancies in
the salaries and standards of living for ministers and many dispossessed ex-combatants
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lead to deep disillusionment and frustration compounded by Zimbabwe’s declining
economy.
Defense of multipartyism in the 1980s culminated with the formation of the
Zimbabwe United Movement (ZUM) by former ZANU-PF Secretary-General Edgar
Tekere in 1989. ZUM represented the pervasive cynicism in Zimbabwean society and
the desire for an end to the corruption that had began to cripple its government and
economy. Unfortunately, due to harassment, financial limitations, and a lack of media
access, Tekere and ZUM won only two out of a possible 120 seats and achieved no
lasting political change in the 1990 general elections. However, by gaining 18 percent of
the vote in parliamentary elections and 17 percent for Tekere, ZUM laid the foundation
for a society where discourse and pluralism superseded repression and one-partyism.
As the 1980s drew to a close, Zimbabwe had undergone a transformation from an
isolationist nation dominated by the vestiges of colonialism and minority rule to the great
hope of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, as the second decade of independence began,
Zimbabwe faced increasing pressures to abide by the mandates of a neo-liberal Western
economy in the post-Cold War era. In addition to mounting debts and falling
commodities, the ideological revolution that had defined the independence movement for
fifteen years failed to inspire a critical citizenry. With this new era came mounting
obstacles and increasingly vocal opponents who threatened ZANU-PF’s stranglehold on
power. The following chapter will analyze Mugabe’s reactions to these challengers, as
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well as how Zimbabwe declined into a nation defined by authoritarianism and reactionary
politics.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ZIMBABWE’S SECOND DECADE OF
INDEPENDENCE

This chapter analyzes the international and domestic issues which defined
Zimbabwe’s second decade under majority rule, beginning with the onset of economic,
political, and social problems at the end of the 1980s and leading to radical land
redistribution by the end of the decade. Specifically, it examines three primary issues
central to the rise of authoritarianism and the eventual dissolution of democratic
institutions. First, World Bank and IMF sponsored economic liberalization and its impact
on Zimbabwe’s economy and land redistribution schemes; second, the rising tension
between civil society organizations (CSOs) and the Zimbabwean government over a
breakdown in democratic institutions, intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo
and the lack of compensation for long-forgotten veterans of the Second Chimurenga; and
third, widespread land seizures by war veterans following the failed constitutional
referendum of 2000 and ZANU-PF’s implementation of Fast-Track land reform.
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Economic Decline and Land Reform Under Structural Adjustment

Zimbabwe’s economic deterioration at the end of the 1980s was primarily due to
wasteful state expenditure and policies that favored colonial institutions deemed
necessary for economic viability.

Widespread corruption and cronyism, failed

management of parastatals, dependence on external markets, and the loss of private
investment led to increasing public debt. By 1990, continued development along the
lines of Mugabe’s socialist vision was unfeasible and conflicted with the realities of neoliberal Western economics. Therefore, under pressure from the World Bank and IMF, the
Ministry of Finance announced in 1991 the adoption of an Economic Structural
Adjustment Program (ESAP) package.

The ESAP package mandated the following

conditions: economic liberalization, currency devaluation, and removal of government
subsidies.
ESAP was derived from neo-liberal economic theory, which believes companies
grow best through trade liberalization and access to new production methods.
Competition through importation encourages specialization and diversification and weeds
out inefficient producers through a form of economic natural selection. Furthermore,
open trade improves welfare conditions due to increased opportunity and decreased
poverty.

A more concise definition describes neo-liberalism as “a means towards
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enhancing human

development,

social

welfare,

and

sustainable

growth

and

development.” 61
Despite previous failures where structural adjustment caused “misery, increased
hardships, deterioration of human development, destruction of poor peoples’ livelihoods,
[destruction of the] environment, high rates of inequality, [and the] marginalization of
poor countries and their communities,” 62 Zimbabwe was forced to accept ESAP in order
to receive additional loans from Bretton Woods institutions. To combat critics of ESAP,
officials emphasized the program’s “homegrown” nature, claiming that unlike previous
attempts to introduce neo-liberal economic reforms in the developing world, Zimbabwe
would protect its citizenry from the pitfalls of liberalization. However, critics of ESAP
have recently posited that ZANU-PF’s true motivation for introducing economic
liberalization was that after a decade of independence the state was no longer a viable
medium for wealth acquisition. 63 Regardless, structural adjustment effectively ended the
decades-old state interventionalism that had resulted in a bloated bureaucracy a little
room for capital investment.
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Table 4.1. Percentage Distribution of Gross Domestic Income, 1985-1990
Wages & Salaries

1985
47.7

1986
49.1

1987
53.7

1988
49.1

1989
47.2

1990
47.0

Surplus

52.9

51.4

46.7

50.8

52.4

52.9

Rent

1.9

2.0

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.3

Source: Calculated from Quarterly Digest of Statistics, CSO December 1999 in Godfrey
Kanyenze, “Performance of the Zimbabwean Economy, 1980-2000,” in Twenty Years f
Independence in Zimbabwe.
Key goals of the ESAP were:
•

Achieve GDP growth of 5 percent between 1991-1995;

•

Raise savings to 25 percent of the GDP;

•

Raise investment to 25 percent of the GDP;

•

Achieve and export growth of 9 percent per annum;

•

Reduce the budget deficit from over 10 percent of the GDP to five percent by
1995;

•

Reduce inflation from 17.7 percent to 10 percent by 1995 64
While the primary reasoning for structural adjustment was to help countries

prevent crippling debt, currency devaluation and higher interest rates made repayment
more expensive, further increasing budget deficits. In order to achieve their adjustment
goals, the Zimbabwean government suspended its statist measures of price controls and
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subsidies, and set specific goals that included the removal of export incentives, phasing
out import licensing, eliminating foreign currency controls, reducing tariffs, removing
surtaxes, raising the minimum duty to 10 percent, and achieving an export growth rate of
9 percent from 1991 to 1995. Unfortunately, core stakeholder groups such as small scale
commercial farmers, labor, and small businesses were not thoroughly consulted before
the policy was implemented resulting in a lack of national ownership. However, big
business groups, and especially the black bourgeoisie, were well informed and
represented by the government-sponsored Indigenous Business Development Center
(IBDC).
Central to Zimbabwe’s structural adjustment was the effect of liberalization on
land redistribution and the conflict between white and black capital. Due to sweeping
indigenization programs of the late 1980s and early 1990s many indigenous elites sought
to become large scale commercial farmers. 65 While the indigenization lobby pressed for
deracilization and land ownership reclassification, reforms continued to benefit whiteowned large scale farms, further retarding rural development and deepening racial
divides. While the IBDC’s initial mission was to aid small and medium-sized black
entrepreneurs, as the decade progressed the organization became further aligned with the
international donor community, shifting their focus towards acquiring equity in large
corporations rather than supporting the development of new ones.
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ESAP represented a fundamental shift in the priorities of land redistribution.
Policies in the 1980s sought to rectify unequal allocation by affording property rights to a
wide spectrum of the population. The government hoped that by appropriating land for
the landless, war veterans, commercial farm workers, and refugees, that economic growth
and a heightened level of political stability would be reached through promoting national
self-sufficiency and agricultural development. 66

Under structural adjustment and its

emphasis on diversification, large-scale farmers were able to erode the land rights of the
peasant majority by promising economic growth. Therefore, land policies shifted from
an emphasis on wealth realignment and indigenization to capitalizing on the most
profitable export-based commodities.
By failing to adhere to a strict fiscal policy and succumbing to the destabilizing
affects of structural adjustment, Zimbabwe’s economy began a half-decade of serious
decline and increased indebtedness. Real economic growth decreased from a rate of 4
percent from 1985-1990 to a paltry 0.9 percent during ESAP. Employment grew at only
0.8 percent, compared to 2.4 percent in the previous five years, and inflation skyrocketed
from an annual average of 11.6 percent to 27.6 percent. Reduction of government
subsidies severely degraded public enterprises, amounting to $3.8 billion in losses from
1992 to 1994. Consequently, the government had to borrow heavily causing outstanding
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debt to rise from 42.5 percent of the GDP in 1990 to 82.6 percent in 1993 before
dropping to 66.9 percent in 1995. 67
Table 4.2. Trade Liberalization and Economic Performance
Economic Sector
Before ESAP (1985-1991)
After ESAP (1992-1997)
Real GDP Growth
5.3%
3.2%
Agriculture
6.6%
10.0%
Manufacturing
8.9%
-0.7%
Mining
4.5%
2.3%
Source: Moses Tekere, “Trade Liberalization Under Structural Economic AdjustmentImpact on Social Welfare in Zimbabwe,” (paper presented at the Poverty Reduction
Forum for the Structural Adjustment Program Review Initiative, April 2001), 7.

By 1995, NGO poverty analysts concluded that the negative impacts of structural
adjustment on the economy and poverty alleviation far outweighed any positives. World
Bank assessments concurred with independent studies and conceded that:
“The concerns…go beyond the issues of pace and design: the comprehensiveness of the
program seems a fundamental issue, especially given the objective of reducing poverty.
Given the highly dualistic nature of Zimbabwe’s economy (where the white minority
dominates formal sector economic activity and owns two-thirds of high potential land,
and the black majority is concentrated in rural, communal areas and the urban informal
sector), it would appear that some basic questions were not explicitly addressed at the
outset. First, would ESAP, predicated on the formal sector acting as an engine of growth
create sufficient jobs, quickly enough, to address the serious problems of
employment?...Even realization of the most optimistic scenarios for formal sector growth
will not provide a quick solution to the unemployment problem.” 68

Regardless of ESAP’s flawed design, the IMF’s suspension of loans in 1995 had little to
do with their own shortcomings and everything to do with Zimbabwe’s inability to curb
their budget deficit and manage their balance of payments. Ultimately, “[L]iberalization
67
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proceed[ed] ahead of deficit control, leading to declining growth and insurmountable
obstacles to debt reduction.” 69

Civil Society Challenges to State Power

ESAP’s failure and the Zimbabwe’s deteriorating economic climate caused the
government to look for alternative means of economic revitalization. However, the
widespread unpopularity of ESAP resulted in two years of indecision on the part of
economic policy makers.

It was not until 1998 that the government launched the

Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST).

Under

ZIMPREST Zimbabwe sought an annual GDP growth of 6 percent, the addition of
42,200 new jobs per annum, a per capita income growth of 3.4 percent, and a 4.4 percent
growth in consumption. To achieve these goals, Zimbabwe needed to decrease their
budget from 10 to 5 percent of their GDP, reduce inflation from 20 percent to single
digits by the year 2000, increase levels of saving and investment, and increase export
growth by a minimum of 9 percent. 70
ZIMPREST emphasized the need for strict fiscal responsibility, civil service and
parastatals reform, and stakeholder participation in policy decisions. However, these
changes were never implemented. Additional calls for democratization reform, good
69
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governance, and the elimination of corruption were ignored. 71 In response to rising
unemployment, record inflation and interest rates, ever-increasing deficits, continued
corruption, and mismanagement within the government, civil society organizations
(CSOs) -- notably trade unions and veterans’ organizations -- began pressing for more
transparent representation from their elected officials and demanding a greater voice in
the political process. 72 1996 saw the beginnings of mass strikes throughout the public
sector culminating in 232 strikes in 1997, more than in any year since independence.
Additionally, stay-aways and public protests showed the ability of organizations like the
ZCTU and their Secretary General Morgan Tsvangirai to mobilize large groups against
government policy and action.
Table 4.3. Strikes from 1991 to 2000
Jan Feb Mar
1991 0
0
0
1992 1
2
2
1993 5
2
3
1994 2
0
0
1995 2
2
1
1996 0
0
0
1997 3
3
6
1998 6
9
21
1999 6
28
5
2000 5
12
14
Source: Government of
Welfare, 2001.

71
72

Apr May
0
0
0
1
3
3
0
0
6
4
12
9
7
19
9
0
14
8
8
16
Zimbabwe,

Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct
0
0
0
0
0
3
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
3
3
0
0
0
0
0
4
6
12
8
9
6
8
3
4
12
18 28 16
22
98
0
3
3
16
10
4
11 6
13
19
12 10 22
10
9
Ministry of Public Service,

Nov
0
0
0
0
11
7
5
5
17
12
Labor

Dec
5
3
0
0
0
0
7
17
17
0
and
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“Zimbabwe on the brink of anarchy: civic groups,” Zimbabwe Independent, January 23, 1998.
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Total
5
14
23
2
65
62
232
119
148
130
Social

To

protest

their absence

from

political

involvement

and

the

rising

authoritarianism of ZANU-PF, labor movements, student and youth groups, women’s
organizations, churches, business and lawyers’ groups, and NGOs formed the National
Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in May 1997. Launched in January 1998 73, the NCA’s
goal of “[S]triv[ing] to protect, promote, deepen and broaden the concepts and practice of
democracy, transparency, good governance, justice and tolerance in the Republic of
Zimbabwe” 74 was part of a broader effort to forge an alternative political voice which
stressed counter-hegemonic ideologies that incorporated a wide spectrum of business and
social interests. In addition to consolidating domestic support, the NCA also sought the
support of international civil society organizations. 75
Additional criticism came from independent human rights organizations, most
notably the Catholic Church. In March 1997, the Catholic Commission for Justice and
Peace (CCJP) published their damning Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland &
Midlands. The report detailed the regional context behind ZANU-PF’s fear of subversion
and the methods by which they quelled perceived resistance during their consolidation of
power in the first decade of independence.
In addition to human rights, militarism continued to play a central role in criticism
over Mugabe’s intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998.
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Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the new Tutsi-dominated government, aided
by Uganda and Eretria, decided to attack the Hutu army residing in the Congolese
borderlands. Zimbabwe, along with fellow South African states Namibia and Angola,
sent troops to help support the Kabila regime due to the vast amount of mineral wealth
possessed by the DRC and its potential membership in a Southern Africa economic
consortium. 76
Intervention in the DRC facilitated two key desires of Mugabe and Zimbabwe’s
ruling elite.

First, the conflict led to high levels of profiteering by military and

government officials through mining concessions, preferential trade, and the supply of
arms, food, and goods. Second, since the end of Apartheid, Mugabe desperately sought
to regain the international prominence he once held as leader of Front Line States. Upon
gaining control of the defense arm of the South African Development Community
(SADC) in 1996, Mugabe set out to assert his influence in regional conflict mediation.
Zimbabwe’s initial involvement in the DRC consisted of three thousand troops,
combat aircraft, and armored vehicles. This number would eventually reach eleven
thousand with a daily operating cost of U.S. $1 million in 1998. It is estimated that in all,
Zimbabwe spent nearly U.S. $263 million in the DRC, with some claiming significantly
higher totals. As casualties and costs mounted, severe criticisms arose from the news
media 77 and CSOs and caused the IMF and Western lenders to question future
investments. Additionally, the Zimbabwean military itself was beginning to question
76
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their presence in the DRC. A report by the Standard in January 1999 claimed that
twenty-three officers had been arrested in December 1998 for planning a coup against the
government. 78 Mugabe’s enraged reaction and the Central Intelligence Organization’s
(CIO) prolonged detention and abusive interrogation of Standard editor Mark
Chavunduka demonstrated the desperation of the government to quell any perceived
dissent as well as their complete disregard for civil rights, the private media, and judicial
process. 79
By the end of the decade, Zimbabwe had successfully alienated itself from the
majority of the international community. Continued concerns over human rights and
pervasive corruption lost Mugabe the support of Western governments while his blatant
refusal to adhere to Word Bank and IMF conditions demanding a reduction in
government payroll, relaxation of import controls, and streamlined regulations aiding the
start-up of small and medium-sized businesses resulted in the loss of support from both
organizations. 80 However, it would not be the cessation of international aide which
would cause disastrous upheaval in Zimbabwe’s next decade of independence, but the
dissention of war veterans of the Second Chimurenga, the men and women who Mugabe
had built his support upon twenty-five years prior.
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War Veterans and Shifting Power Dynamics

No group reflected the deep disillusionment of Zimbabwe, or would have a more
lasting impact on the relationship between the state and the governed, than the war
veterans of the Second Chimurenga. By the late 1990s veterans became central actors in
the escalation of Zimbabwe’s economic and political deterioration due to their ability to
transcend the constraints of authoritarianism and successfully challenge state power.
By late 1997, veterans of Zimbabwe’s liberation war had become exceedingly
frustrated over unfulfilled wartime promises for land and wealth redistribution.
Ironically, the liberation war remained ZANU-PFs primary source of political legitimacy,
with veterans representing a key constituency. However, due to a lack of organization,
veterans found themselves marginalized for over a decade and a half while Mugabe
extolled revolutionary rhetoric for his own political gains.
Beginning in March 1997, tensions reached a boiling point when the Zimbabwean
government was forced to suspend payments from the War Victims’ Compensation Fund
due to excessive corruption and theft.

After Mugabe continually dismissed their

grievances, war veterans altered their tactics from negotiation to outright confrontation.
Protestors harassed party officials and organized rallies in major cities, culminating on
August 11th with a mass demonstration against ZANU-PF during Mugabe’s Heroes’ Day
Speech. To prevent a violent escalation, Mugabe agreed to resume payments and award
gratuities to each of the fifty thousand veterans claiming compensation. The estimated
61

total cost was an unbudgeted Z$4 billion that tripled currency devaluation to U.S. $30
and brought about an economic crisis from which the country has yet to recover.
In addition to the economic fallout, Mugabe’s capitulation left the state
vulnerable to a further devolution of authority.

Desire for a politically expedient

resolution had significantly weakened Mugabe’s hold on power.

Specifically, the

dynamic between the state and the governed had been inverted with the government
finding itself at the mercy of those who had been longstanding instruments of ZANUPF’s political machine. Now organized and motivated by success, the War Veterans’
Association (WVA) and their leader Chenjerai “Hitler” Hunzvi sought greater political
gains by articulating the landlessness of many disenchanted Zimbabweans.
As part of its agreement with the WVA a $50,000 gratuity, $2,000 tax-free
monthly pension, and free healthcare and education would be provided to veterans and
their families. 81 Additionally, 20 percent of all those selected for resettlement were to be
ex-combatants. 82 Since land was one of the few commodities that could still effect mass
political mobilization, in late 1997 ZANU-PF selected 1,471 commercial farms for
compulsory acquisition and resettlement. However, the careless nature in which lands
were seized caused open contention within the courts. Of the farms designated for
resettlement, 625 were undesignated. Land hungry veterans, incited by ZANU-PF’s false
promises, began occupying rural areas between June and August 1998. 83 In addition to
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actual veterans, the WVA’s ranks began to grow with an influx of unemployed youths
who found the veteran movement to be the only effective vehicle of advancement free
from state intervention. It was this contingent that carried out the majority of violent
seizures in the following years.
However, while war veterans represented the most aggressive threat to Mugabe’s
power, it was the rise of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which
constituted the greatest long term threat to ZANU-PF’s political hegemony. Mugabe’s
overriding fear of his waning popularity and MDC support would become the impetus for
the final chapter in Zimbabwe’s decline into economic, social, and political chaos marked
by violent land seizures and economic ruin.

Opposition, Invasion, and Fast-Track Land Reform

By the late 1990s, Mugabe found himself at the center of an international storm
due to Zimbabwe’s failing economy, questions over human rights, and their continued
intervention in the DRC. Additionally, threats from war veterans and CSOs, and strikes
and demonstrations by organized labor confirmed that a large portion of Zimbabwe’s
citizenry no longer supported ZANU-PF with the same fervor that had existed in the
1980s. Unfortunately, the lack of a viable opposition party left the majority of the
population with a pessimistic apathy towards the future of political pluralism. However,
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in February 1999, in the wake of a withering economy and unchecked land seizures by
war veterans and their supporters, the ZCTU approved the formation of the Movement
for Democratic Change (MDC).
The MDC’s primary objective was to be a viable political party that could
successfully contest elections and give the public an alternative option to ZANU-PF.
Officially launched in September of 1999 under the leadership of ex-ZCTU secretary
general Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC entered the Zimbabwean political arena during a
period of severe national discontent. Much like the NCA, the MDC harnessed a broad
spectrum of CSOs into a coalition with the overarching purpose of removing ZANU-PF
and Mugabe from power.
Formation of the MDC coincided with another major turning point in the political
and social transformation of Zimbabwe. Beginning in early 1999, Mugabe appointed a
constitutional reform commission aimed at replacing the 1979 Lancaster House
Constitution and quelling pressure from the NCA for democratic reform. After over five
thousand meetings, the four hundred person commission delivered a draft constitution to
Mugabe in November 1999 that addressed many of the criticisms that had plagued the
government since independence, notably human rights and freedom of the press. 84
Additionally, it provided for a Prime Minister and removed the President’s power to
appoint his thirty members to Parliament. However, the constitution’s final draft was not
a unanimous decision as twenty commission members found it a poor reflection of the
84
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peoples’ will. Notably, it allowed Mugabe to continue as President for an additional two
terms.
At its core, Zimbabwe’s constitutional referendum represented an open forum for
post-independence grievances concerning abuses of power and the failing economy.
NCA and MDC opposition sought to limit presidential and state power, and campaigned
vigorously to thwart any attempt by ZANU-PF to prolong their reign by focusing on the
country’s mass unemployment, increasing poverty, fuel shortages, corruption scandals,
and intervention in the DRC. 85 In a last-minute bid for votes, Mugabe added a clause
allowing land seizures by the government without compensation, and demanded that
Great Britain, as the former colonial power, provide compensation for seized land.
However, in the face of NCA, MDC, and CSO opposition, the referendum failed
in February 2000 57.4 percent to 45.3 percent, cementing the first political defeat for
ZANU-PF and the first popular victory for the MDC. 86

In the words of Jocelyn

Alexander:

“The constitutional referendum of February 2000 marked a watershed in Zimbabwean
politics…The referendum defeat marked the moment when it became clear that the ruling
party faced a major electoral challenge in the shape of the Movement for Democratic
Change…It forced an immediate and dramatic shift in the strategies of ZANU-PF in
which veterans and the land took center stage.” 87
As a result of the referendum’s failure, the political and social rhetoric of Mugabe
and ZANU-PF took on a far more racially charged tone. This new message cast white
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Zimbabweans as unrepentant racists who represented the last vestiges of colonial
occupation. Veterans, once severe critics of the government, were recast as heroes of
Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle who now existed to re-exert ZANU-PF’s influence in the
rural regions it once dominated.
Beginning in late February 2000, veterans began what has been frequently called
jambanja, a period of chaos and lawlessness. A series of well-coordinated governmentsponsored invasions of white-owned farms left over thirty people dead (mostly MDC
supporters) and countless more injured. Known as the Third Chimurenga, the invasions
represented a desperate attempt to reclaim the revolutionary essence that had defined
Mugabe’s early successes. Despite rulings that found the seizures to be illegal, the end of
constitutional restrictions on acquisition payments left many without a legal leg to stand
on. Further eroding the court’s authority was the overt aid of government bodies like the
CIO, who directed veteran operations and selected specific farms for invasion.
Ultimately, land occupations were designed to set the stage for a political
campaign that played to ZANU-PF’s large constituency of communal farmers and
simultaneously punished supporters of the opposition, namely white farmers and their
labor force. 88 As the parliamentary election of 2000 began, veterans became the militant
wing of ZANU-PF, waging a campaign of intimidation and violence against the MDC
and its supporters while Mugabe and ZANU-PF leaders vilified white farmers, painting
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them as imperialist cronies. 89

Despite its best efforts, the judiciary was openly

undermined and state-owned television and print media were utilized solely by ZANUPF. In the end, ZANU-PF’s violent campaign resulted in a marginal victory that hinged
primarily on the terror of rural populations.
Table 4.4. 2000 National Assembly Election Results
Party
Votes
% Votes
Seats
% Seats
ZANU-PF
1,205,844
48.10
62
51.7
MDC
1,171,167
46.72
57
47.5
ZANU-Ndonga 15,766
0.63
1
0.8
Other
114,186
4.55
0
0.0
Total
2,506,973
100.0
120
100.0
Source: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa,
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zimresults2000p.htm (accessed June 1, 2009)

Following ZANU-PF’s slim victory, the party intensified its use of jambanja to stamp out
opposition support before the presidential elections in 2002. In an effort to make the land
a focal point over a woeful economy and human rights, veteran groups began a new
phase of occupations commonly referred to as “Fast-Track” resettlement that employed
two models, A1 and A2. A1 resettlement focused on small-scale farms and villigisation
similar to that which took place in the late 1980s. A2 was intended for medium and large
scale farms, specifically those which possessed the greatest resources. While ZANU-PF
claimed that Fast-Track resettlement would allow for personal self-sufficiency, a cadre of
indigenous farmers, and black entrepreneurs, the truth remained that land facilitated little
more than ZANU-PF’s retention of power. Ultimately, Fast-Track resettlement’s greatest
89
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flaw was that it paid little or no attention to infrastructure development and instead
sought to resettle as many individuals as possible. 90
Table 4.5. Land Settlement Patterns Before and After Fast-Track Resettlement
Date
Type

November 1997
Area (Millions
Percentage
Ha)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
3.6
9.1

November 2003
Area (Millions
Percentage
Ha)
4.2
10.6
2.2
5.6
3.7
9.3

A1
A2
Old Resettlement
(1980-1997)
Communal
16.4
41.4
16.4
41.4
Large Scale
12.4
30.5
2.6
6.6
Commercial
National Parks and
1.4
3.5
1.4
3.5
Urban
State Land
6.0
15.2
6.0
15.2
Other
N/A
N/A
2.8
7.1
Total
39.6
100.0
39.6
100.0
Source: The Herald, October 26, 2003 and Medicine Massiwa, Land Reform Program in
Zimbabwe: Disparity Between Policy Design and Implementation, Institute for
Development Studies, University of Zimbabwe

As white farmers and the CFU attempted to challenge the seizures in court,
ZANU-PF and war veteran leaders chastised their attempts and threatened those civil
servants who attempted to defend white clients. Fast-Track reform’s chaotic nature led to
a steep escalation of claims and complaints from organizations ranging from the MDC
and CFU to the Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union (ICFU), General Agriculture and
Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), and the Zimbabwe Farmers Union
(ZFU). However, little could stop Fast-Track reform, as it had ceased to be about wealth
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redistribution and correcting the injustices of colonialism and instead facilitated little
more than ZANU-PF’s political survival and land grabs among the elite.
While Mugabe claimed that Fast-Track resettlement had ended as of August 2002,
police seizures continued into the next year. Damage caused to Zimbabwe’s
infrastructure and economy was incalculable. Underutilization of farms, unqualified
personnel, mass unemployment, shortages of foreign currency, and severe food shortages
compounded the international isolation, drought, and political upheaval that had defined
the past five years. Mining and manufacturing fell sharply and agricultural production
crashed. Ultimately, unchecked land redistribution was the final nail in Zimbabwe’s
coffin, plunging the country into utter destitution.

69

CHAPTER FIVE: MURAMBATSVINA AND THE AFTERMATH OF
FAST-TRACK LAND REFORM

Mugabe’s improbable victory in the 2002 presidential election over MDC leader
Morgan Tsvangirai only cemented the belief among international lenders that Zimbabwe
had fallen into autocracy and further investment constituted a wasted expenditure. 91
Refusal to permit international observers, gerrymandering of polling stations, and
intimidation by the Zimbabwe Republican Police (ZRP) 92 and youth militias caused the
European Union, the United States, and the British Commonwealth to declare the
elections unfair. 93 Mugabe simply responded with obstinance, and opposition supporters
across the country were imprisoned, beaten, and murdered. Tsvangirai himself was
briefly imprisoned and charged with treason. By 2003, Zimbabwe had ceased to have
any defining characteristics of a transparent and stable democracy, instead reverting to
tyrannical rule.
By 2004, over three million Zimbabweans (roughly one-quarter of the population)
had fled to neighboring countries resulting in regional tensions and border disputes.
Unemployment had reached 80 percent, 68 percent of the population lived below the
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poverty line, and food was being used as a political tool. 94 With the 2005 parliamentary
elections approaching, few believed that the results would end in anything less than a
victory for ZANU-PF. However, in contrast to their previous electoral practices, ZANUPF utilized mass electoral fraud instead of widespread violence and intimidation. Once
the results had been tallied, predictions held true, but likely did not reflect the true voice
of Zimbabwe’s citizenry.
Table 5.1. 2005 House of Assembly Election Results
Party

Votes

% Vote

Seats

% Seats

ZANU-PF

1,569,867

59.59

78

65.0

MDC

1,041, 292

39.52

41

34.2

Independents

16,878

0.64

1

0.8

ZANU-Ndonga

6,608

0.25

0

0.0

Total

2,634, 645

100.0

120

100.0

Source: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa,
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zimresults2005.htm (accessed June 1, 2009).

Despite a solid “victory” for ZANU-PF, an examination of regional election
results shows that ZANU-PF’s support base still resided primarily within rural sectors,
while MDC supporters came from urban centers. In an act of retribution against MDC
supporters, and under the pretense of urban renewal and crime prevention, Mugabe
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instituted the program of Murambatsvina 95 on May 18, 2005. While official reasons
claimed a need for the “eradication of chaos that currently prevails in the City,” 96 The
operation quickly escalated into “a deliberate nationwide campaign, destroying what the
Government termed illegal vending sites, structures, other informal business premises
and homes, literally displacing hundreds of thousands of people.” 97 Consequently, an
estimated five hundred thousand individuals were left homeless while nearly one hundred
thousand were left without any source of income. A lack of food, water, shelter,
sanitation facilities, and medical care created a humanitarian emergency while church
organizations, humanitarian aid agencies, and neighboring governments were
overwhelmed by the flood of refugees flocking across Zimbabwe’s borders.
In addition to the human toll, Murambatsvina caused further deterioration of
Zimbabwe’s informal sector and continued harm to a country already facing severe
budget deficits, triple-digit inflation, a chronic shortage of foreign currency, and
desperate need for food and fuel. 98 In the words of the United Nations Special Envoy,
“Operation Restore Order [Murambatsvina], while purporting to target illegal dwellings
and structures and to clamp down on alleged illicit activities, was carried out in an
indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with indifference to human suffering, and, in
repeated cases, with disregard to several provisions of national and international legal
frameworks.”
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Simply put, Murambatsvina represented the desperation of Robert Mugabe and ZANUPF to maintain power, and was the final measure for their complete disregard for
democratic institutions, rule of law, and human life.

Conclusion

This thesis has analyzed the political, economic, and social factors which directly
led to Zimbabwe’s implementation of Fast-Track land reform and its consequent
destruction of peace and prosperity. Specifically, it maintains that while Fast-Track land
reform was the significant catalyst propelling Zimbabwe’s decline to unforeseen levels, it
was not the sole cause. Throughout majority rule, Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF have
steered a ship sinking under the weight of its colonial legacy, the ideals of Mugabe’s
socialist vision, mismanagement and corruption at every level of government, and the
crushing effects of economic liberalization. Desire for political consolidation and onepartyism resulted in the violent repression of human rights and condemnation by an
international community that once held Mugabe in the highest regard. Finally, the everpresent specter of land has haunted Zimbabwe since its earliest colonial memories, been
the deepest desire of the dispossessed masses, and the most powerful political tool
available to a ruling elite facing severe questions of legitimacy.
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Central to Zimbabwe’s decline was the loss of political pluralism after only seven
years of majority rule. ZANU-PF’s consolidation of power marked the end of a
democratic culture necessary for political tolerance and the preservation of peace.
Additionally, the methods by which Shona-centric ZANU-PF exerted its authority over
Ndebele opposition supporters only deepened claims of ethnic favoritism and alienated
important constituencies. Finally, the contradictory nature of the resulting Unity
Accords, which cemented power in the executive and weakened legislative oversight,
only resulted in further divisiveness between the Zimbabwean government and civil
society.
Additional strain came from worsening economic conditions. While not
comparable to the crippling levels of the following decade, by the late 1980s,
Zimbabwe’s excessive spending on social programs, coupled with corruption and global
economic decline, resulted in rising levels of indebtedness to international financial
institutions (IFI’s). Increased dependency on IFI’s and the need for additional loans
necessitated Zimbabwe’s acceptance of the IMF and World Bank Economic Structural
Adjustment Program in 1991. While economic liberalization was intended to open doors
for new business ventures while simultaneously weeding out poorly performing
enterprises, ESAP instead resulted in rising unemployment, increased poverty, declining
industrial output, and new opportunities for corrupt governance.
As a consequence of increased corruption by government officials, the failure of
ESAP, a marginalization of civil society organizations, unrealized promises of land
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resettlement, and their costly military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe had lost legitimacy with the Zimbabwean people.
Successful strikes and demonstrations by labor unions and land seizures by veterans
groups only emphasized the rising opposition against the government. With the failure of
Mugabe’s constitutional referendum -- a final attempt to prolong his term and once again
popularize himself with the masses through revolutionary and racist rhetoric -- he was
forced to utilize politically expedient methods to shift the national focus to a re-emergent
land issue, the only piece of political currency available to him. Land invasions by
veteran groups and the consequent expulsion of white farmers led to a period of
widespread violence and fear which allowed for ZANU-PF to maintain a slim majority in
the National Assembly above the powerful opposition coalition Movement for
Democratic Change.
Institution of Fast-Track resettlement the that same year represented the death
knell of Zimbabwe’s social, economic, and political security. Division and poor
management of once prosperous farms left the agrarian base of Zimbabwe’s economy
shattered and ruined. Additionally, the complete lack of democratic stability, disregard
for judicial authority, mass human rights violations, and economic destitution left IFI’s
reluctant to offer any aid to the one-time breadbasket of Africa.
At present, Zimbabwe is in the throes of a major humanitarian crisis. It has been
beleaguered by ever increasing rates of HIV and AIDS, low population growth, acute
food shortages, radically decreasing life expectancy, hyperinflation, and insecurity of life
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and property. Additionally, the growing brutality of political and electoral oppression has
engendered significant domestic, regional, and international condemnation. News media,
human rights organizations, and foreign governments have all called for the end of
Zimbabwe unchecked deterioration at the hands of Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF.
While it has been less than thirty years since Zimbabwe gained its independence
through a prolonged and bloody conflict, it stands as an example of how a nation’s
colonial legacy, in concert with the realities of the international economic system, can
result in the deterioration of peace and prosperity. However, Zimbabwe’s unfulfilled
promise speaks to not only to its own colonial legacy, but also the aftereffects of
colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Racial tensions, in conjunction with the ever-present
specter of land, created deep seeded distrust between the new majority government and
colonial institutions necessary for economic, political, and social stability. Additionally,
the ideological conflict between Mugabe’s socialist vision and Western democratic
principles resulted in a strained relationship between Zimbabwe and international lenders.
Finally, IMF and World Bank structural adjustment represented the continued imposition
of Western institutions on the developing world. Ultimately, Zimbabwe illustrates the
ability of failed governance, when left unchecked, to be intensified by international
intervention, leading to the breakdown of social harmony.
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